

No More Blood for Oil. How Could EU Help?

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Abstract. The continuing cold war due to oil (its politicization and the profound military involvement), subsequently, the re-grouping of nations based on ideology was inter-changed with re-alignment among producers and transit states either in alliance with Russia as resource broker versus the umbrella group of American and Western conglomerates. Fuel conflict in current parlance – as nations of limited resources must secure supply at all cost (part of national security); EU, in particular, in jittery over Russian supply cut-off wants to partly replace with Caspian and Middle East oil transiting via the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Indian Ocean. Second, as nations of bountiful reserves are in competition to dominate world energy trade and the intention to manage market demand; in particular, petro-state Russia shall sustain supplier status or energy card (supply, transport, distribution) to reassert regional power after Cold War defeat. Third, powers' volition to secure enormous supply to establish leadership among worldwide energy buyers (indirect hegemony), America, in particular, struggled for supply security and pursued unilateralism – to sustain her 'informal empire' on finance, control of raw materials and international trade; hence, the control of the world energy spigot and transit routes which entail solid alliance among re-transit and consuming states, i.e. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, Georgia, Ukraine rallying under American flag aspired to weaken Russian fuel business.

Keywords: EU Energy Policy, EU-Russia Relations, US Unilateralism (energy factor), Energy and Russia Resurgence, Russia and Central Asia

Нет нефти ценой крови. Как Евросоюз может помочь?

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Аннотация. Продолжающаяся холодная война из-за нефти (ее политизация и явная военная вовлеченность) и последующая перегруппировка государств, базирующихся ранее на идеологии, изменились вместе с переориентацией производителей и транзитных стран или на Россию как ресурсного брокера, или на зонтичную группу американских и европейских конгломератов. Топливный конфликт в нынешней терминологии заключается в том, что страны с убогой ресурсной базой стремятся к обеспечению себя во что бы ни стало (как частью национальной безопасности). В то же время, в особенности ЕС, опасаясь сокращения добычи нефти в России, пытается обеспечить себя частично каспийской и ближневосточной нефтью через Средиземное море, Черное море и Индийский океан. Во-вторых, страны с обильными запасами нефти в борьбе за мировой рынок конкурируют с Россией, старающейся восстановить свой региональный статус после поражения в холодной войне. В-третьих, США в своих имперских стремлениях остаются лидером среди покупателей (косвенная гегемония) ведут борьбу за безопасность поставок и свою исключительность, с желанием остаться «неформальной империей» финансового рынка, осуществлять контроль натуральных ресурсов и потоков международной торговли.

Ключевые слова: энергетическая политика Евросоюза; отношения ЕС – Россия; американский односторонний подход (энергетический фактор); энергия и российское возрождение; Россия и Центральная Азия.

INTRODUCTION

The study of how EU could help transform the fate of oil and eventually world destiny as oil became a factor in international crisis since the dawn of 20th century. The argument if glass is half-full or half empty, similarly, to analyze EU hysteria over reduced or temporary cessation of Russian gas supply, or is it Russia that is afraid of losing EU as its main customer?

ECSC task was to eliminate the fear over Germany coal and steel; hence, the policy of pacifism or sink deeply in an attempt to get rid of Russia in the framework of Western energy game. From offensive neo-realism to constructivism, EU should cater with the resource holder aims and fears for what spark petro state aggression was the deep desire to avoid the economic fate of the USSR and the aspiration to be recognized/respected power; second, address EU misperceptions towards Russia as her main supplier while addressing supply sustainability; third, check on American unilateralism motivated to cut-off Russia as energy power.

Underneath Russia's struggle is the pursuit of national economic interests or Gazprom's business interests through economic partnership with the West, especially energy ties with the EU having no other well developed resources/industry to offer. Hence, enhanced EU-Russo relations to work collectively in difficult areas (Arctic, Russia), therewith to attain other goals — secure fuel availability through valid contracts and entice Russia to join oil regime towards better investment law; ease the pain in times of price collapse, i.e. measures to manage loss of fuel income; lead the transition from petro state to the rise of other industry.

The pursuit of oil utilitarianism as with Silk Road and consortium investment in transoceanic internet cable system, Russian oil is not worth killing anymore, instead to fulfill energy security, in effect, check both U.S. unilateralism and Russia policy of avenging humiliation after Cold War defeat. In working with supply disruptions, arrange with Russia that could cover her economic and political interests; there was an adjustment in East-West relations during the Cold War — the West secured supplies as Siberian fuel base was built using Japanese/Western technology and scientific know-how; in the process, it helped Western economy in times of recession in 1970s, provided market for huge pipelines (steel), and economy

multiplier effect as gas equipment-services were created. As decade long sales contract and payment through buy-back was initiated, other business deals followed — joint manufacturing, equity participation, sub-contacting, turn-key delivery to factories, granting of licenses or large orders of industrial goods.

Section I discusses oil vis-à-vis international relations; section II, EU energy situation; section III, deals on how EU as an actor to help lessen conflict of interest, secure stable supply through stabilize relations with Russia, and check on United States unilateralism.

I. OIL POLITICS

Natural resources laid the foundation of a progressive civilization, however, the struggle to obtain, its trading and utilization changed the course of world history — as international corporations held great economic power and political influence, subsequently, the ascendance of colonialism which impacted traditional society, dragging their government which influenced international relations including great power rivalry¹. Similarly, the value of oil as it empowered machines invented during the Industrial Revolution, later, trade complexities evoking power and wealth, defining the nation's economy and the

¹ The influence of natural resources relative to international politics — at first, simple buy and sell business by local traders but were overtaken by stronger powers, to illustrate — African gold was originally traded by travelling Moors, however, Portuguese wanted said trading rights to pay for the purchase of Asian spices, and so followed Portugal colonization of West Africa. From economic presence to political imperialism — to secure Africa's cheap and abundant raw materials such as copper, cotton, rubber, palm oil, cocoa, diamonds, tin which were not available in Europe but needed to sustain her industries and the availability of human slaves to cultivate Americas/Caribbean cotton, tobacco, sugar plantations, eventually, by 1914, 90 percent of African continent was under Portugal, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain control, only Ethiopia and Liberia remained independent. Imperial governments were increasingly involved to protect and sustain the interests of commercial associations, if not, assumed direct command over trading privileges which followed tensions, i.e. Anglo-French rivalry which was solved through partition of Africa. On the other hand, real or perceived rival power encroachment led to local wars and its underlying impact upon international relations, i.e. Boer War, Moroccan Crisis, etc. and also continental economic restructuring, for instance railway proposals by France from Algeria to Morocco and Britain from Cape to Cairo. Vide: John M. MacKenzie, *The Partition of Africa, 1880–1900 and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Kentucky, USA: Routledge, 1983) pp. 11–13; “Scramble for Africa” in *Wikipedia* (last modified December 14, 2015) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scramble_for_Africa (Accessed January 2, 2016).

direction of her foreign policy for both producers and consumers. In this millennium, the escalating complexities of geopolitics in the drive to secure petroleum categorized under national security² or “access to energy resources may become an object of large-scale armed struggle is almost incontestably the single most alarming prospect facing the international system today”³, and the militarization of international energy commerce to ensure transport security which called forth “the protection of the entire chain through which supplies move from initial production down to the final consumer”⁴.

Oil wars shattered post-Cold War peace — Iraq invasion of Kuwait, Georgia (the first Russia-USA proxy war), Afghanistan, Syria;⁵ however, *pax* petroleum is not impossible or the wisdom to transform world destiny by converting oil from war

to peace. The calls for pacifism wherein hostile intentions are eliminated — towards cooperation, harmony, positive human relations or international disputes over oil market/business peacefully resolved⁶, and the pursuit of utilitarianism, oil simply a commodity to be traded rather than an adjunct factor of Russian *revanche* and American unilateralism⁷.

⁶ Scholars identified two types of peace — “negative peace and positive peace: negative peace is the absence of violence or war while positive peace encompasses cooperative, tranquil, and harmonious relations and the broader concerns of human flourishing and integration. Quote: “Pacifism” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (substantive revision August 14, 2014) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pacifism/> (Accessed February 15, 2017).

⁷ President Clinton crusade for globalization, in reality, “the globalization of American power, consolidated through American banking and finance and corporate power”; President Bush, Jr. advocated Project for the New American Century emphasizing America unique responsibility to preserve and extend an international order that would reinforce her security, prosperity, principles or global hegemony through enhanced military capabilities, leadership in the international organizations (NATO, IMF, United Nations, etc.), sustain U. S. Dollars as the world dominant currency, above all, prevent the rise of another power which may challenge American dominance. Juxtaposing PNAC ideology, America shall ensure a stable global oil market (availability of enormous fuel) and its smooth business — “no seller or group of sellers can dominate the market and thereby threaten the access of the US or its allies to purchase the supplies of oil needed to conduct normal everyday consumer business and military operations.” In pursuance thereof, America shall consolidate dominant position in the post-Soviet environment to preserve US/Western access to oil regions’ and gain new reserves to ameliorate US energy dependence in the Persian Gulf; curtail the leverage of existing mammoth producers (i.e. Russia and Iran) as well as strengthen relations with Turkey and the former Soviet Republics. Thus, the United States moved on to consolidate control over world energy spigot as well as the transport route and infrastructures, eliminate competitors and safeguard the area politically-militarily through direct hegemony/surrogate powers under the aegis of ‘War on Terror’, ‘Arab Spring’, ‘Color Revolution’, military operation in Kosovo, civil war in Syria and so effectuate regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, furthermore, Kurdistan and Kosovo emerged as independent states. Quote 1: Engdahl, William. *Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order* (London, GB: Pluto Press, 2004), p. 224; Quote 2: Amy Myers Jaffe and R Soligo “Energy Security the Russian Connection” in *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management*, Daniel Moran and James A. Russell (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 112; Vide: Adeyinka Makinde, “Vladimir Putin and the Patterns of Global Power” in *Global Research* (November 02, 2015) http://www.globalresearch.ca/vladimir-putin-and-the-patterns-of-global-power/5486083?utm_campaign=magnet&utm_source=article_page&utm_medium=related_articles (Accessed March 30, 2016); “The Project For A New American Century!” in “The 11th Hour” http://www.11th-hour.info/Articles/Project_for_a_New_American_Century.html (Accessed March 28, 2016); M. Sussex, “Strategic Security and Russian Resource Diplomacy”, in *Russia and Its Near Neighbours: Identity, Interests and*

² In an effort to sustain oil overflow despite the tempest of current international situations, so led to the militarization of energy resource management in three forms — “infrastructure and asset protection — physical protection of refineries, pipelines, loading facilities, offshore fields, and sea lines of communications; regime protection, or military support for governments that facilitate the export of their country’s oil reserves to foreign markets; and access assurance, or military moves intended to ensure uninterrupted access to key oil producing regions, such as the Persian Gulf.” Quote: Mikael Klare, “Petroleum Anxiety and Militarization” in *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management*, Daniel Moran and James A. Russell, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 47.

³ Daniel Moran and James A. Russell, “Introduction: The Militarization of Energy Security” in *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management*, Daniel Moran and James A. Russell, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 2.

⁴ Daniel Yergin, *The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World*, (Penguin Books, 2012), p. 280.

⁵ The oil factor — Syria as transit for Qatar-Syria-Turkey gas pipeline combining hydrocarbons from Qatar, Israel, North Africa, Caspian, Caucasus, Kurdistan, then link-up with Libyan gas and extend the pipeline to Cyprus-Greece or Crete-Turkey as endpoint; a friendly Afghan government to facilitate the control and marketing of Caspian supply as well as secure by-pass export route being the gateway to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, if America foregoes Afghanistan, then Iran and Turkmenistan would gain a space to maneuver and render useless the best exit for Caspian fuel that it could secure, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline. Vide: Taylor McCamy, “Talking Points on the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline”, <https://moraloutrage.wordpress.com/2010/04/25/talking-points-on-the-trans-afghanistan-pipeline/> (Accessed February 27, 2015); Fox Hunte, “The Geo-Strategical Importance of Afghanistan” (Oct 23 2001) <http://everything2.com/title/The+geo-strategical+importance+of+Afghanistan> (Accessed February 24, 2015); “Israel Targets Energy Superpower Status”, in *Energy Tribune* (March 30, 2011), <http://www.energytribune.com/7283/israel-targets-energy-superpower-status#sthash.2RWp11qa.szFPXnpU.dpuf> (April 21, 2015).

II. EU OIL-GAS SITUATION

EU is an oil-gas importer through and through as oil proven reserves merely at 1 percent, 2 percent for natural gas, 4 percent coal which could not sustain the huge consumption of 28 heavy industrialized states⁸. It is projected that EU shall import two-thirds of energy consumption by year 2020⁹, or recent import data — “53% of the energy it consumes, including almost 90% of its crude oil, 66% of its natural gas and 42% of its solid fuels such as coal... [and] heavily dependent on one single supplier, namely Russia, responsible for a third of oil imports, 39% of gas and 29% of solid fuels. Six EU countries depend on Russia as the supplier for their entire gas imports.”¹⁰ Theoretically, EU supply is well secured as “80 percent of the world’s proven natural gas reserves fall within conceivable pipeline distance”¹¹ or the presence of multiple suppliers at each geographical angle — Russia to Central/East Europe wherein 39 percent of gas supply was obtained in year 2013; Norway to West Europe at 34 percent; Algeria to South Europe at 13 percent; Qatar 7; Libya and Nigeria, 2 percent

Foreign Policy, Maria Raquel Freire and Roger E. Kanet, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 212.

⁸ EU-28 Main Trading Partners of Petroleum Oil, Crude, NLG (2013).

	Value	Net Mass		Value	Net Mass
Russia	33%	34%	Azerbaijan	5%	4%
Norway	11%	11%	Iraq	3%	4%
Nigeria	9%	8%	Angola	3%	3%
Saudi Arabia	8%	8%	Mexico	2%	2%
Kazakhstan	7%	6%	Egypt, Kuwait, Equatorial Guinea	1% each	1% each
Libya	6%	6%			
Algeria	5%	5%			

Chart: Eurostat, Extra-EU28 imports of petroleum oil, crude and NLG, main trading partners, 2013. May 28, 2014 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Extra-EU28_imports_of_petroleum_oil_crude_and_NLG_main_trading_partners_2013.png#filehistory (Accessed October 14, 2015).

⁹ Brenda Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), p. 129.

¹⁰ The EU’s Energy Dependence: Facts and Figures” (July 24, 2014) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140718STO53032/html/The-EU%27s-energy-dependence-facts-and-figures> (Accessed October 10, 2015).

¹¹ Robert Winchester, “European Energy Security Wrestling the Russian Bear for Caspian Natural Gas” in Program Research Project submitted to U. S. Army War College (June 30, 2007) <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA471533> (Accessed July 4, 2014).

each¹². Hence, what concerns EU is not supply availability or source per se, but relations among suppliers, notably, Russia her main gas supplier;¹³ interchangeably, West Europe is Gazprom main market taking 82 percent or 130.052 bcm (billion cubic metre) of total export in 2015, of which 28.508 bcm (18 percent) was delivered to East and Central European states¹⁴.

Although no fault of their own, EU Members has been the indirect victim of numerous supply disruptions and there was no other way to immediately replenish the shortfall;¹⁵ in concern over future incidents and extreme dependence

¹² Eurostat, “Extra-EU28 imports of natural gas (liquefied, gaseous state), main trading partners, 2013” (May 28, 2014) [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Extra-EU28_imports_of_natural_gas_\(liquefied_gaseous_state\)_main_trading_partners_2013.png](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Extra-EU28_imports_of_natural_gas_(liquefied_gaseous_state)_main_trading_partners_2013.png) (Accessed October 14, 2015).

¹³ The legality governing EU-Russia energy relations: PCA (1997), EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (2000), and Four Common Spaces (2003), but, reaching an agreement seems difficult — in contrast with other buyers, China for instance, their main goal is merely to obtain hydrocarbons, EU include other issues such as environment, market openness, transportation and investment conditions; a cumbersome process which is difficult for Russia to adjust and fit with EU aspiration for supply security. Second, the presence of multiple actors such as the Commission, EU member states, the EIB, the EBRD, European and Russian energy companies; third, EU took ECT as the main concrete pillar of its external energy policy and as the key platform to institutionalize energy relations with the widest variety of third parties which Russia is not keen to participate. *Ibid*, Geo-politics of the Euro-Asia energy nexus, pp. 54, 55.

¹⁴ “Gazprom Export Delivery Statistics” <http://www.gazprom-export.ru/en/statistics/> (Accessed April 24, 2016).

¹⁵ Background of supply disruptions — producers were at war or undergoing national crisis, i.e. 1956 Suez Canal, 1967 Six Day War, 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran-Iraq War; infrastructural weakness such as lack of supply storage (flow stopped from ex-Soviet Republics); 1973 Arab deliberate oil embargo to attain political objectives at the international level. Arab embargo deeply embedded consuming nations’ psyche or pushed nations to be concerned with energy security, thus, the strategy of “stockpiling of crude oil in cases of emergency and disruption; coordination on sharing oil supply; pursuing policies of energy conservation, promoting efficiency measures, monitoring and analyzing the oil market; increased transparency in the oil market data; and, more recently, engaging in constructive dialogue with oil producers.” EEC countries would have not been affected in the Arab-Israel conflict had they exhibited neutrality for Arab embargo was a retribution over West Europe deep attachment with United States foreign policy; hence, energy security could be attained if the marketing of resources was transacted purely under commercial manner by the producers and consumers refrained from political involvement. Quote: Ibrahim Mazlum, *Twenty First Century Energy Security Debates: Opportunities and Constraints for Turkey*, in Guney, Nursin Atesoglu, ed. *Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey*, (Abingdon, Oxon, GBR: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2007), p.136; Vide: Amy Myers Jaffe and Ronald Soligo, *Energy Security: The Russian Connection in Energy Security and Global Politics*, p. 129.

on Russian fuel, EU adopted the strategy of “diversifying energy sources and suppliers, cutting back on energy consumption, boosting energy production and cooperation between countries and investing in renewables.”¹⁶

III. PAX-PETROLEUM, HOW COULD EU HELP ATTAIN THIS GOAL?

Wrong decision, wrong policy, wrong alliance — again the world in delusion of fighting a just war; the burden of its legacy would impact generations to come, why not then the wisdom to end this treacherous and nonsensical cycle of energy war? Per EU option to reduce ‘over-dependence’¹⁷ and America motivation to cut-off Russia as energy power, consequently, “Russia’s

¹⁶ “The EU’s Energy Dependence: Facts and Figures” (July 24, 2014) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140718STO53032/html/The-EU%27s-energy-dependence-facts-and-figures> (Accessed October 10, 2015).

¹⁷ To follow through, the European Commission adopted three core policies — first, the plan to increase LNG consumption from 8.9 to 31.8 percent by year 2030 and construct re-gasification facilities by 221 billion capacity m³; implement a coordinated EU policy that no national government shall negotiate with another party over energy supplies, purchases, and consumption. Second, undertook EU framework in institutionalizing multi-lateral cooperation with energy suppliers, transit states, consuming countries that are increasingly dependent on energy imports like China and India; to call upon Common Foreign and Security Policy (one of her pillars) in integrating energy into broader external relations such as market liberalization, dispute settlement, crisis response mechanism, international agreements to boost investment environment wherein European companies could win long-term business contracts. Third, the construction of infrastructural supply systems commissioned as Southern Gas corridor, Mediterranean Energy Ring, North Sea and North West Offshore Grid, North-South Interconnection (interconnect Central, South East Europe, Baltic region); accordingly, Germany-Italy-Poland-Czech Republic and Slovakia-Hungary interconnectors; four pipelines to transport Norway gas; Southern Corridor Gas Pipeline or Azerbaijan-Turkey oil/gas pipelines were inaugurated. Under review: a) LNG terminal in Greece; b) Interconnectors: Galsi (Algeria-Italy- France, Sardinia-Corsica) and Azerbaijan-Georgia- Romania Interconnector; Poland-Lithuania-Serbia; Finland- Estonia; Germany-Denmark-Sweden; c) Pipelines: Nabucco, Trans-Saharan (Nigeria-Algeria gas), Trans-Adriatic (Caspian-Turkey-Greece); Copenhagen-Poland Baltic Pipe; Mid-Nordic Gas Pipeline (Norway-Finland). Vide: Tekin, Ali, Paul Andrew Williams. *Geo-politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 26, 42, 43, 46; Ian Traynor and Arthur Neslen, “Ambitious EU Blueprint for Energy Union to Loosen Russian Grip on Gas” in *Guardian News* (February 24, 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/24/eu-blueprint-energy-union-russian-gas-gazprom-maros-sefcovic> (Accessed February 27, 2016) “EU Energy Markets in 2014”, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_energy_market_en_0.pdf (Accessed April 27, 2016).

pursuit of alternate partnerships and forums has been a result of its disappointment with the West and the feeling that it has not been accorded due respect as a result of US unilateralism and European neglect.”¹⁸ It is imprudent for the West to restrain Russia for Europe is the destination of more than 90 percent of her gas export; “in this case, the non-Western nations beginning with Russia will continue to act in defiance by unilaterally asserting what they see as their strategic and economic interests. In the absence of sufficiently strong international institutions, such interaction is likely to facilitate new conflicts, not peace and stability in the world.”¹⁹

Denying Russia the right to pursue its energy interests and to establish an independent energy policy at home and in Eurasia is sure to come with large political and economic costs... A prolonged cycle of hostilities shaped by clashing American and Russian perceptions of each other’s energy intentions, resulting in...energy security dilemma and...the militarization of the global struggle over energy supplies. Economically...the isolation of prominent American companies from developing important energy fields and energy relations abroad²⁰.

The best that EU could do is to cater with the aims and fears of the resource holder; in the crusade to reduce energy conflict, EU shall take Russia as a valuable partner, wherein Russia need not fight back to defend her market by knocking-out EU unified energy policy²¹ and in-

¹⁸ Kristi Govella and Vinod Aggarwal, eds. “Russian Foreign Policy: Challenging the Western Liberal International Order?” (Springer, 2012), p. 134.

¹⁹ Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Russia in the Post-Western World: the End of Normalization Paradigm?” in *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Volume 25 Issue 4, October-December 2009 <http://china.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2747/1060-586X.24.4.347?journalCode=rpsa20> (Accessed November 18, 2016).

²⁰ Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Russian Policy and Responses from the European Union and the United States” in *Responding to a Resurgent Russia*, p. 49.

²¹ To uphold herself as Europe absolute supplier held since Soviet era, Russia constructed new pipelines in cooperation with participating nations energy departments rather than expand/rehabilitate existing facilities, in effect, the direct transport from Russian fields which reduced extreme transit path dependence or eliminated the burden of third party delivery interruption which import dependent states feared most; forfeited FSU bargaining chip over selling price, transit fee, opportunity for gas theft and derailed payment; availability of alternative-spare pipeline as solution in case of full shut-down of Ukrainian system as old pipelines would self-destruct after decades of utilization, business conflict or war. Infrastructural system constructed under Putin — Bal-

tensify politicking to get on southern producers to balance export commitments vis-à-vis huge domestic consumption and over production of older fields²². Fuel trade as a tool to deepen economic relations wherein Russia must comply to sell voluminous quantity at agreed price, i.e. signing of a long term contract as Russo-Sino gas deal in 2016, and an opportunity to promote interdependence wherein a negotiated agreement would convince Russia to accept an open and accommodating investment environment which could accelerate the development of her fuel in-

tic Pipeline System (2012) shipping oil to Europe by tankers navigating Ust-Luga canal and so reduced volume shipped via Druzhba; Blue Stream (2003) which reduced gas shipment via Ukraine system to Turkey or pipeline account “for over a half of the total gas volume (26.7 billion cubic meters) exported by Gazprom to Turkey in 2013”; Nord Stream (2012) which delivered 1 Tcf gas annually mainly to Germany or 24% transit reduction via Ukraine (48.7 bcm in 2011). The prospect of building Nord Stream II per September 2015 agreement, then, Europe dependence on Russian gas supply would increase to 80 percent or 60 percent for Germany and the enhanced reliance on Russian route. Quote: LNG World News «blue-stream-delivers-100-bcm-of-gas-to-turkey <http://www.lngworldnews.com/blue-stream-delivers-100-bcm-of-gas-to-turkey/> (Accessed February 24, 2017); Vide: Manfred Hafner, “Russian Strategy on Infrastructure and Gas Flows to Europe”, in POLINARES working paper n. 73, (December 2012), http://www.polinares.eu/docs/d5-1/polinares_wp5_chapter5_2.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2014); “Gazprom to Open Nord Stream-2 by 2020” in RT.News (June 26, 2015) <https://www.rt.com/business/269923-gazprom-miller-russia-gas/> (October 10, 2015); Elizabeth Corner, “Nord Stream II Looks to Hire Contractors” in Palladian Publications Ltd. (October 19, 2015). <https://www.energyglobal.com/pipelines/project-news/19102015/nord-stream-ii-looks-to-hire-contractors> (Accessed December 19, 2015); Silvestar Matejak, “Nord Stream 2-New Gas Pipeline from Russia to Europe” in e-metallicus (September 9, 2015) <http://e-metallicus.com/en/news/eu/nord-stream-2-new-gas-pipeline-from-russia-to-europe.html> (October 10, 2015); “The Baltic Pipeline System” in Администрации Ленинградской области <http://eng.lenobl.ru/economics/investment/principlefederalprojects/Balticoilpipeline> (Accessed December 10, 2014).

²² Per Russia’s situation, the need for external assistance to raised fuel production, subsequently, export capability. The “giant fields” of Yamburg, Urengoy, and Medvezh’ye, which currently account for more than 60 percent of total Russian production, have started to decline. Production at Zapolyarnoye, a fourth giant field that came on stream in 2001, has recently reached its peak... [Exploration and production] e&p costs for developing fields on the arctic Yamal Peninsula and on the Ob-Taz shelf will amount to \$25 billion, and yet another \$40 billion in pipeline infrastructure to connect these fields to the existing system...\$17 billion per year through 2030 [needed] in e&p projects and in the maintenance of current fields in order to meet domestic demand and to fulfill export commitments. Quote: Andreas Goldthau, “Resurgent Russia? Rethinking Energy Inc.” in Hoover Institution Policy Review (January 29, 2008) <http://www.hoover.org/research/resurgent-russia-rethinking-energy-inc> (Accessed March 24, 2016).

dustry²³. To acknowledge Russia’s precious role or the availability of Russian oil to minimize the impact of supply interruptions, i.e. war, terrorism, political instability, resource nationalism, ethnic/sectarian strife, underinvestment, closure of navigational routes.

[Time now to]... abandon the logic that any other behaviour on Russia’s part as a threat to the West, as a sign of authoritarianism, of an ‘energy war’, that the ‘Russians are coming’ and so on. The starting point for a genuine dialogue must be the recognition that each party has its own interests. These interests do not always coincide (between supplier and consumer this is natural), but that certainly does not mean that they are mutually exclusive and insurmountable. On the contrary, they are naturally complementary²⁴.

Whenever business gas dispute unfurled and as transit states obstructed fuel supply, automatically, third party consumers considered it as Russia “energy weapon”²⁵. In working with

²³ Gawdat Bahgat, “Energy Security: An Interdisciplinary Approach” (U.K.: Wiley, 2011) p. 173.

²⁴ Konstantin Kosachev, “Do we have a shared future in energy?” in “Pipelines, Politics, and Power: The Future of EU-Russia Energy Relations” in CER2016. <http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/report/2008/pipelines-politics-and-power-future-eu-russia-energy-relations> (Accessed June 15, 2011) p. 49.

²⁵ Ex-republics pipelines needed by Russia to transport to Europe: a) Moldova, 25 bcm flows to Moldova and Southern Europe (Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Western Turkey, Slovakia); cut-off on summer/winter of 1999–2000 and January 2006 for 16 days due to domestic upheaval as gas must pass through Transnistria Republic main trunk lines before reaching Moldova proper. b) Ukraine, 80 percent of Russian gas, 14–17 percent of her oil, and small quantities of Central Asian gas transit through Ukraine five gas trunk lines Brotherhood (Bratstvo), Orenburg (Soyuz), Urengoy Center, Yamburg (Progress), Northern Lights (Siyaniye Severa); fuel cut-off concurred in 1992, 1993 1994, January 2006, January 2009, June 2014. c) Belarus, Northern Lights and Yamal-Europe pipelines to deliver gas to Belarus Poland, Baltic States, Kaliningrad enclave (Russia), Frankfurt Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium; Druzhba transports 30 percent of Russian oil at a total of 40 million tons annually, of which 400,000 barrels per day delivered to Poland, Germany at 350,000 b/d, and the rest to Ukraine, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary. Oil non-shipment concurred from January 9–11, 2007 and gas for eighteen hours on February 2004. Vide: Pirani, Simon, ed. Russian and CIS gas Markets and their Impact on Europe (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2009), pp. 98, 109, 110; Nadejda Victor and David Victor, “Bypassing Ukraine” in Victor, David, Amy Jaffer, and Mark Hage, eds. Natural Gas and Geopolitics from 1970–2040 (Cambridge University press 2006), p. 131; Dellecker, Adrian and Thomas Gomart, ed. Russian Energy Security and Foreign Policy Brothers to Neighbours (Routledge, 2011), p. 193, 232; Natalia Shapovalova, “Ukraine: Lynchpin for European Energy Security”, in Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y

Russia, EU should well analyze supply threat or energy weapon exist only as perception rather than an objective reality; to consider instead, what to do over extreme dependence balancing Russian interests for the prosperity of both economies²⁶. Behind supply cut-off was business profit maximization or selling price hike resulted to non-affordability²⁷, accordingly, non-payment, impacted delivery to other buyers as transit states siphoned gas for their constituents and was not Russia's intention, in fact, in the early stages of supply disruption, Russia wanted to get hold of the earlier Soviet energy system so as to contain continual disruption.

After heavily subsidizing its former Soviet allies throughout the past 15 years, Gazprom has increased gas prices in CIS countries and pushed to equalize prices net of transit fees with those it charges its West European clients... In case an affected country is unable to pay the new price, Gazprom accepts in-kind payments, including shares of national or regional gas providers or pipeline grids — assets it would otherwise have to buy as an integral part of its expansion strategy²⁸.

el Diálogo Exterior (July 2008) http://fride.org/download/DB_Ukraine_UE_Lynchpin_ENG_agu_08.pdf (Accessed June 4, 2011).

²⁶ In reality, EU had the upper hand — “Poland imports nearly all its gas from Russia, this accounts for less than 8 percent of total primary energy consumption (which is overwhelmingly dominated by coal). Germany has long had a ‘special’ relationship with Moscow, yet Russian gas comprises less than 10 percent of its primary energy consumption.” Second, Europe has an advantage over Russia, having numerous oil refineries or “a country with a seaport equipped with an oil refinery can enjoy a continuous supply of refined oil. If the pipeline route leading to a refinery is cut, in theory it can always buy crude from tankers.” Quote 1: Bobo Lo, *Axis of convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics* (Washington, DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press, 2008) p. 150; Quote 2: Anita Orbán, *Power, Energy, and the New Russian Imperialism* (Praeger, 2008), p. 83.

²⁷ Like any other corporation, the concern for profit to survive and there is no other way for Gazprom to do so but to turn to foreign buyers or extreme dependence on profit from West European sales to compensate for losses by subsidizing domestic market as obligated by law. “More than two-thirds of Russia's annually produced 600 bcm is already used in households, industry, transport, heating, and power plants...domestic Russian gas prices are only a fraction of prices charged on foreign markets, amounting to only 17 percent of West European gas prices in 2006–29 percent when taking into account transit charges.” Quote: Andreas Goldthau, “Resurgent Russia? Rethinking Energy Inc.” in Hoover Institution Policy Review (January 29, 2008) <http://www.hoover.org/research/resurgent-russia-rethinking-energy-inc> (Accessed March 24, 2016).

²⁸ Andreas Goldthau, “Resurgent Russia? Rethinking Energy Inc.” in Hoover Institution Policy Review (January 29, 2008) <http://www.hoover.org/research/resurgent-russia-rethinking-energy-inc> (Accessed March 24, 2016).

In line of fire, EU actual concern should have been how to avail gas uninterruptedly for buyers who would pay; instead, EU solution was “system-building activities such as the dimensioning of Western Europe's underground gas storage facilities, its efforts to build interconnecting pipelines with alternative gas suppliers, and its overall ambitions to diversify supply.”²⁹ In a sense, a noble purpose but wrong decision as potential suppliers/transit states may not be able to supply gas for a long term in a stable manner — how could Georgia rise as a major transport corridor for Caspian Sea/Central Asia producers and Turkey as re-transit route to Europe with so many uncertainties, i.e. politically unstable, Russia military bases are stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Kurdish insurgency, the unresolved Caspian Sea status and Caucasus frozen conflict (Nargono Karabakh).

Second, the realization that it is utterly nonsensical for Russia to attempt, intend or actualize the denial of gas supply, in fact, Russia proposed or built new pipelines to get rid of third party dilemma³⁰. Once pipeline has been constructed and gas delivery began and so buyer-seller ties is held in tight; business-wise, it is necessary to sustain huge sales to recuperate early on billions of investment for “the cost of natural gas is a function of the distance between the consumer and the extraction site: the longer the distance, the higher the costs of natural gas”³¹ In reality, it is Russia that needed EU as sales market and investment capital source in critical areas such

²⁹ H̄mrogselius, Per. *Red Gas: Russia and The Origins of European Energy Dependence* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 221.

³⁰ Moscow another approach was to control the supply through joint ventures, equity ownership in the downstream sector with major national energy infrastructure companies, accordingly, Gazprom purchased Topenergy in 1998 (Bulgarian distribution company); Gaz de France allowed Gazprom direct access to France retail gas market; Gazprom invested \$2.6 billion in 23 big ventures in 2004 such as 50 percent stake in Solvrusgaz (Slovakia), 48 percent Eruopol Gaz (Poland), 30.6 percent Eesti Gaas in Estonia. Vide: Gal Luft and Anne Korin, *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook* (Praeger Security International, 2009), pp. 93, 94; Kirsten Wesphal, *Gemany and the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue* in Parni Aalto, ed. *EU-Russia Energy Dialogue: Europe's Future Energy Security* (Abingdon Oxon, GBR: Ashgate Publishing group, 2007), p.101; Robert Winchester, “European Energy Security Wrestling the Russian Bear for Caspian Natural Gas” in Program Research Project submitted to U. S. Army War College (June 30, 2007) <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA471533> (Accessed July 4, 2014).

³¹ Anita Orbán, *Power, Energy, and the New Russian Imperialism*, p. 83.

as offshore drilling and LNG, logically speaking, why would Russia freeze supply to existing buyers (EU) while trying to gain new markets, i.e. Turkey and China? No one wants supply disruption as buyers want supply commitment from producers, while producers does not want to lower demand/sales volume due to the high cost of investment, market development, etc. Therefore, EU in jittery over supply withdrawal is untenable as producers or petro-state depend on oil income through and through critically needed for social, economic, political stability or the most classic example is the continued oil flow from Islamic Iran despite professed anti-Western regime.

Third, EU could well manage energy security based on historical experience — Egypt and Israel peace accord as concerns for supply of water and energy resources were addressed; similarly, EU could establish an energy regime under her auspices — among its task is to help European conglomerates gain Russian business or play a significant role in oil/gas explorations; manage Ukraine energy system such that Russian gas would not disrupt other end consumers nor would Russia has the reason to engage on economic and political machinations among weaker ex-republics³². On the other hand, Russian VIOCs controlled 95 percent of

³² Theoretically, if Russia lost Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan resources to competitors and if Georgia gained considerable momentum over transit route, consequently the forfeiture of her southern European fuel market dominance and diminish her regional influence. The rivalry over Caspian is “a zero-sum game in which US advances would come at Russian expense. So the completion of the BTC probably hardened Russian resolve to continue its support for Armenia and separatist regions in Georgia, in a bid to block US strategic projection into the region.” Russia must block Armenia as transit route to Turkey, otherwise, it would render redundant Russian northern Caucasus route along with planned southern Europe pipelines; the control of Central Asian deposits — prevent producers from becoming international competitors or exclude international conglomerates equity ownership and retain maximum control over transport infrastructure or exclusive position in the transit of hydrocarbons so as not reduce Russia’s competitiveness in the world market. Quote: Peter Rutland, “US Energy Policy and the Former Soviet Union: Parallel Tracks” in *Our Energy Policy* <http://www.ourenergy-policy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/US-energy-policy-towards-Russia.pdf> (Accessed August 9, 2015); vide: Michael Klare, *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy* (Oneworld Publications, 2008) pp. 75, 76; T.S. Eder, *China-Russia Relations in Central Asia* (Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2014) pp. 46, 66; Vladimir Likhachev, “The Role of Energy in Russia’s Relations with Turkey and Iran” in paper presented for The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey Ankara, International Workshop “The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Economic and Energy Dimensions” (March 29, 2012), p. 3.

crude production and 80 percent refining or only 25 percent oil production and 16 percent refining capacity is under state controlled companies;³³ basically, private companies would find loopholes vis-à-vis government policies detrimental to their business interests being heavily dependent on global market to keep afloat, neither would Russian government harm their endeavors as it would be a hard task to regain consuming states trust and confidence to re-purchase after cut-off.

In sum, per the criteria of supply security, it is best for EU to enhance Russian level of participation rather than her alienation³⁴ for “there will not be any sufficiently strong competitor to take Russia’s place as an essential energy supplier of the EU, at least in the short term”³⁵, anyhow, nations accounted as potential producers or transit states may not be best competent to exchange Russian oil. EU needed to find a middle ground that Russia would withdraw as a major spoiler of Western policies in Eurasia and beyond; EU has no choice but to choose partnership being technically dependent on Russia as supplier within proximity and in difficulty to attain a unified energy policy³⁶ as “big Western customers such as Germany, Italy, and

³³ Andreas Goldthau, “Resurgent Russia? Rethinking Energy Inc.” in Hoover Institution Policy Review (January 29, 2008) <http://www.hoover.org/research/resurgent-russia-rethinking-energy-inc> (Accessed March 24, 2016).

³⁴ The contradictions — Russia viewed EU as a way to integrate into the developed world, as investment source, trade and aid; on the other hand, EU is considered as a rival power and a destabilizing factor over issues such as democracy and human rights. Javier Morales, “Russia as an Energy Great Power: Consequences for EU Energy Security” in *Energy Security Visions from Asia and Europe*, Antonio Marquina, ed. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 29.

³⁵ Dimitrios Triantaphyllou and Yannis Tsantoulis, *Russia in EU and US Foreign Policy: The Energy Security Dimension*, in *European Security in Transition*, Hause, Gunther, and Kernic, Franz, eds. (Abingdon, Oxon, GBR: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2006) p. 286.

³⁶ EU general policies deterred states as outcome may have negative impact upon respective national interests or disagreement over distribution of benefits as nations that face higher risk would ask for more benefits; energy is considered as part of national security such that states sought to conclude bilateral agreements based on geopolitical conditions, energy mixes, and relations with suppliers rather than complicate matters by following with EU; Members are reluctant to transfer jurisdiction to the complicated and slow wheels of EU structural tier and various institutions. Thus, Member States signed bilateral agreements and negotiated pipeline projects such as Nord Stream and South Stream, projects not between EU and Russia but direct negotiation between Germany, Bulgaria, Turkey, along with their interest to play the role as Russia’s main hub. Vide: Tekin, Ali, Paul Andrew Williams, *Geo-politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus*, pp. 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36.

France are in a position to strike bilateral deals with Moscow, while Eastern states, particularly the most vulnerable ones [being highly dependent] such as Bulgaria, the Baltic States Slovakia, and Hungary, plead for EU-wide solidarity³⁷.”

The prospect for peace as the perception of marketing war was abated — EU should help develop the economy of other continent such that market would be divided among suppliers, simply not to grab for one piece of bone taking Europe and advanced Asian economies as customers;³⁸

³⁷ Gawdat Bahgat, “Energy Security: An Interdisciplinary Approach”, p. 167.

³⁸ What would follow if Russia suffers economic downturn due to the loss of energy business — would the world witness the rise of ultra-nationalist or pro-communist group? Communist China was given Most Favored Nation status and so was able to contribute positively during 2008 financial crisis; so why not the same for Russia’s behest, for instance, a gentleman agreement with America to leave European market for EU to tackle with? If America could convince Saudi Arabia to trade oil in U.S. Dollars (Petrodollars) in exchange for protecting the House of Saud, why EU could do not do similar quid pro quo?

the West should assist Russia to develop her other industries and not to be extremely dependent on fuel economy alone, and self-help for Russia — diversify the economy in considering the perils of petro state or resource revenue is not dependable nor the high value of oil is everlasting³⁹.

³⁹ We may not foresee the defining moments of civilization and progress per the direction to reduce carbon dioxide with another energy source (renewable energy), substituting the century old method of using oil-gas to power machines. Future scenario – By 2035, electric cars could make up 35 percent of the vehicle market, and could account for two-thirds of that market by 2050...[thus] displace 25 million barrels of oil per day...[and] solar power could account for 23 percent of global electricity-generation capacity by 2040, and 29 percent by 2050. Under that scenario, coal would be entirely phased out, while natural gas would account for just 1 percent of the generating mix...about 2 million barrels a day will be displaced by 2025, equivalent to the amount of oversupply that triggered the price crash... Quote: Stephen Edelman, The Christian Science Monitor, Why fossil-fuel giants underestimate electric cars, renewable energy <http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/In-Gear/2017/0213/Why-fossil-fuel-giants-underestimate-electric-cars-renewable-energy> (Accessed February 14, 2017).

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